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SHELF REGISTRATION, INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE, AND
UNDERWRITER DUE DILIGENCE: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
Merritt B. Fox*
N a recent article,1 Professor Barbara Banoff mounted a spirited
defense of the Securities and Exchange Commission's decision to
adopt permanently Rule 4152 under the Securities Act of 1933 (Se-
curities Act).3 Rule 415 permits the registration of securities that
an issuer intends to "put on the shelf" rather than sell immedi-
ately.4 By having a block of "shelf registered" securities available,
an issuer avoids the delay of the registration process once the deci-
sion is made to proceed with a sale. Shelf registration also gives an
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. Yale University, B.A.,
1968, J.D., 1971, Ph.D. (Economics) 1980.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor
J. William Hicks, and members of the faculty workshop of Indiana University Law School-
Bloomington, each of whom read an earlier draft of this article and offered helpful com-
ments. The author also acknowledges, with thanks, the research assistance of Rhonda
Brauer.
' Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of
Rule 415, 70 Va. L. Rev. 135 (1984).
2 SEC Securities Act Release No. 6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889 (1983), reprinted in [Current
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,449, at 86,335 (Nov. 17, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Release No. 6499]. For the text of the new rule, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1984).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
" Rule 415 is a departure from the traditional position of the SEC not to permit an issuer
to register securities that it does not intend to sell immediately. The position was based on
an interpretation of the language of § 6(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C § 77f(a) (1982),
and reflected a policy against the sale of securities on the basis of stale information. See In
re Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109 (1941).
Rule 415 is limited to issuers qualified to use form S-3 (the short form registration state-
ment). See infra note 8. Under Rule 415, registered securities can be offered on a delayed or
continuous basis during a two year period following the effective date of the registration
statement. The issuer need not amend the registration statement during the two year period
unless there has been a fundamental change in the reported information that has not been
disclosed in a subsequent report to the SEC. See infra note 8. The effect of Rule 415 is to
permit an issuer that wishes to sell some or all of the registered securities at any point
during the two year period to contact the several managing underwriters named in the regis-
tration statement, determine which underwriter will give it the best terms, and offer the
security to the market through that underwriter in a matter of hours.
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issuer the flexibility to seek bids from a group of competing under-
writers and bypasses the traditional method of negotiating a fixed
price in advance of sale with just one underwriting syndicate.
A major criticism of Rule 415 is that this speed and flexibility
impede an underwriter's ability to perform "due diligence," its
statutorily induced investigation of the accuracy of the information
contained in the registration statement.5 Professor Banoff uses
5 An underwriter is an intermediary, usually an investment bank, that purchases an is-
suer's offering and then sells it to the public. Most corporations use underwriters in their
public offerings. SEC Monthly Statistical Rev., Apr. 1984, at 29. Section 11(a) of the Securi-
ties Act provides that any person acquiring a security whose registration statement contains
"an untrue statement of a material fact or [omits] to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading" may sue every
underwriter of the security for damages. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982). To avoid liability, the
underwriter must show that "[h]e had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
believe and did believe" that the registration statement did not contain such an untrue
statement or omission. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1982). The investigation and review of the regis-
tration statement motivated by these sections is known as "due diligence."
Though Section 11 imposes liability on a variety of participants in a public offering, in-
cluding the issuer, its directors, and certain of its top officers, underwriter liability is a cru-
cial part of the legislative plan. See Greene, Determining the Responsibilities of Underwrit-
ers Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure System, 56 Notre Dame Law.
755, 767-70 (1981). There are good reasons to believe that such imposition of liability results
in the underwriter, because of its independence, playing a somewhat adverse or "devil's
advocate" role in the drafting of the registration statement. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Because an underwriter participates in numerous public
offerings each year and the management of an issuer does so just occasionally, an under-
writer is much more likely to develop the resources and skill. necessary to perform a thor-
ough investigation than is the management of an issuer. Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 581; Folk,
Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1, 54
(1969). Furthermore, the issuer might find that the gains to be reaped in a successful offer-
ing outweigh the risks of liability for damages for being less than forthcoming or shading the
truth, but the underwriter has little to gain from taking such risks. See Comment, BarChris:
Due Diligence Refined, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1411, 1421 (1968).
Former SEC Commissioner Barbara Thomas is probably the most prominent critic of the
effect of Rule 415 on underwriter due diligence (other than in the case of debt issues of
major companies). Release No. 6499, supra note 2, 48 Fed. Reg. at 52,897, reprinted in [Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,449, at 86,346-47 (Thomas, Comm'r,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); SEC Securities Act Release No. 6423, 47 Fed.
Reg. 39,799, 39,803 (1982), reprinted in [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q
83,250, at 85,279-290 (Sept. 2, 1982) (Thomas, Comm'r, dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Re-
lease No. 6423]. Certain members of the securities industry have taken the same view. Id. at
39,801, reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,449, at 83,336,
86,339. Comments from industry representatives and others are collected in File Nos. 7-869,
7-896, 7-925 and 7-979, SEC Public Reference Room, Washington, D.C. See also Orbe, Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Due Diligence and Rule 415: Another Dilemma, 10 Fla. St. U.L.
Rev. 619, 628-38 (1983) (Rule 415 creates a professional responsibility dilemma for securities
attorneys).
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modern finance theory to argue that this concern is misplaced be-
cause the improvements in information reaching the market
through underwriter due diligence do not benefit investors in a
worthwhile fashion. Due diligence, she asserts, is therefore
unnecessary.
The significance of Professor Banoff's argument extends beyond
the question of whether shelf registration is desirable. Her argu-
ment applies equally to the desirability of "short form registra-
tion," another recent SEC reform. The SEC, recognizing that pub-
licly held corporations are required under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)7 to file periodic reports containing fi-
nancial and other information of interest to prospective securities
purchasers, now permits a large class of issuers to use a short form
Securities Act registration statement that provides for this infor-
mation to be incorporated by reference rather than repeated.8 To-
gether, short form and shelf registration constitute the heart of the
SEC's program of "integrated disclosure," the most important set
I Banoff, supra note 1, at 176-84.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
8 A corporation covered by the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act must annu-
ally file a form 10-K, which covers a wide range of questions about the issuer's business,
finances, and management. In addition, to update the information in the 10-K, the corpora-
tion must fe a quarterly report on form 10-Q. When certain "extraordinary events" happen
the corporation must submit a "current report" on form 8-K. In March 1982, the SEC
adopted three forms, S-i, S-2, and S-3, for the public offering of a new issue of securities for
cash. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,382-85 (1982), reprinted
in [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,328, at 62,994-99 (March 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 6383].
The S-3 form allows an issuer to incorporate by reference into his registration statement
the information provided in the 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings. The only information relating
to the affairs of the issuer that must actually be set out in the registration statement is, in
most cases, the use of proceeds and a description of any material change since the last 10-K
not already described in a subsequent 10-Q or 8-K. Under the eligibility requirements for
form S-3, the registrant must be organized under the laws of, and have its principal place of
business in, the United States (although some foreign private issues may qualify as well).
The registrant must also have regularly filed the reports required under the Exchange Act
for the prior three years and must not be delinquent in its financial obligations. Finally, the
aggregate market value of the voting stock held by nonaffiliates of the registrants must be at
least $150 million, or $100 million with an annual trading volume of at least three million
shares. Id. at 11,384, reprinted in [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328, at 62,997. Louis Loss estimates that 2000 frmns are eligi-
ble to use form S-3. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 144 (1983).
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of changes in the regulation of the sale of new issues since the pas-
sage of the Securities Act.9
The theory behind both parts of the integrated disclosure pro-
gram is the efficient market hypothesis.10 The hypothesis suggests
that all information contained in an issuer's periodic reports is im-
mediately reflected in the price of the issuer's securities. Short
form registration is justified because repetition of information al-
ready expressed in the price of an issuer's securities serves no use-
ful purpose.1' Shelf registration is justified because the statement
registering a securities offering need not be current if the price at
which the securities will be gold reflects information contained in
periodic reports filed between the time the registration statement
becomes effective and the time of the offering.12
Short form registration has been subject to the same criticism as
shelf registration-that it impedes due diligence-and largely for
the same reasons.'3 Professor Banoff apparently realizes that her
argument, if correct, is an effective response to criticism of both
parts of the integrated disclosure program. She suggests that the
SEC exempt underwriters from their due diligence obligations for
"[a]l offerings into an efficient market, whether or not the offering
is shelf registered. 1 4
This article examines whether modern finance theory demon-
strates that the information improvement resulting from due dili-
gence produces no social benefit. It suggests that given a properly
9 The Commission adopted Rule 415 on a temporary basis at the same time that it
adopted its integrated disclosure system. Release No. 6383, supra note 8, 47 Fed. Reg. at
11,380-81, reprinted in [1937-1982 Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 72,328, at 62,990-91.
10 See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
21 Release No. 6383, supra note 8, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382 n.9, reprinted in [1937-1982
Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 72,328, at 62,993
n.9. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41904-05 (1981),
reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. No. 926, extra ed., at 15 (Aug. 13, 1981)
(only limited disclosure necessary for firms whose corporate information is broadly dissemi-
nated and widely followed by analysts).
12 SEC Securities Act Release No. 6334, 46 Fed. Reg. 42001, 42002 (1981), reprinted in
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. No. 926, 2d extra ed., at 6 (Aug. 13, 1981); SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6276, 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Spec. Rep. No. 893, pt. 2 (Jan. 7, 1981).
'3 Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and its Impact on Underwriters' Due Dili-
gence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 Sec. Reg. L.J. 3 (1983) (collecting securities industry
comments on the integrated disclosure program and short form S-16, an earlier step toward
integration for certain issuers).
x' Banoff, supra note 1, at 185 (footnote omitted).
1008 [Vol. 70:1005
Shelf Registration
broad view of the role of the market for securities in our economy,
the opposite is the case. It then examines the issue that Professor
Banoff has largely avoided: the effects of short form and shelf re-
gistration on underwriter due diligence. It finds that the effects are
negative, and concludes that the SEC should develop ways to put
the same kinds of pressures on issuers when they prepare Ex-
change Act periodic reports as underwriters historically placed on
them when the issuers prepared Securities Act registration
statements.
I. THE BENEFITS OF INFORMATION DISCOVERED BY UNDERWRITER
DUE DILIGENCE
Professor Banoff does not claim that underwriter due diligence
fails to improve the quality of information about an issuer reaching
the market,15 but argues only that the improved information pro-
duces no worthwhile benefits. The validity of her argument de-
pends on the range of functions that one believes the market for
securities plays in our economy. The narrowest view is that the
securities market is simply a place to speculate, a Las Vegas for a
more respectable group of individuals. A second, somewhat
broader view is that many investors purchase securities for the
same reason they deposit money in a savings bank not because
they expect to profit from price fluctuations but because they ex-
pect on average to earn a positive rate of return on their invest-
ment. The third and broadest view sees the market not just as an
institution to serve the needs of its participants but as an instru-
ment of social control influencing real economic events: choosing
which proposed investment projects to implement and how to use
the economy's existing productive capacity.
The first view leads, by application of the efficient market hy-
15 Banoff, supra note 1, at 180-81. Some commentators question whether due diligence
has this effect, and suggest that to believe it does is inconsistent with the efficient market
hypothesis. See, e.g., Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market The-
ory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943, 947 (1982).
Professor Banoff correctly rejects that view. Banoff, supra note 1, at 180. Unless there is
truth to the generally rejected "strong form" of the efficient market hypothesis, see infra
note 19, some information known or available to insiders of the corporation is not reflected
in the price of the issuer's securities. The potential liabilities imposed upon an underwriter
in connection with the public offering of securities creates a strong incentive for the under-
writer to uncover some of this information and disclose it to the market.
1984] 1009
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pothesis, to the conclusion that information improvements result-
ing from due diligence are of no importance because the market is
as fair a game with or without improved information. The second
view, implicitly held by Professor Banoff, leads to the same conclu-
sion. Information improvements resulting from due diligence in-
crease the accuracy of the prices of individual securities, but accu-
racy is unneeded. If one holds a portfolio of inaccurately priced
securities, the inaccuracies tend to cancel each other out. The third
view leads to the opposite conclusion. Information improvements
resulting from due diligence produce benefits-increased accuracy
in the prices of individual securities influences the decisions of cor-
porate management in ways that increase the efficiency with which
scarce resources are allocated.
A. The Securities Markets as Las Vegas
The Las Vegas analogy suggests that an investor who purchases
a security believes, based on faith in his luck or in his superior
ability to predict the future, that the price of the security is less
than its "actual value"-the aggregate future stream of income ac-
cruing to its holder discounted to present value.16 The seller be-
lieves the opposite. This sort of trading is a zero-sum game because
whatever one party gains-the purchase of a bargain or the sale of
an overpriced security-the other loses.
The efficient market hypothesis, most broadly stated, is that the
market price of a security "fully reflects" all information available
at the time in question .1 7 The term "fully reflects" is not clearly
16 This definition of "actual value" requires an ex post view to be operative. The "actual
value" of a security at a given point in time, to, cannot be determined until some point in
the future, after the security has paid out its last distribution. In the case of a bond where
the issuer has not defaulted, that future point would be after the date of its maturity. In the
case of a share of common stock, that future point would be after the date of the issuer's
dissolution. A perfectly informed investor would be able to predict the future with certainty,
and could at t o accurately determine the actual value of the security. A real world investor,
using the imperfect knowledge available to him at to, must guess what its actual value is as
of that date.
17 Much has been written about the efficient market hypothesis. The seminal article re-
viewing the work to its date that formed the basis for the hypothesis is Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970). An early
statement of the theory in relatively nontechnical language is J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, The
Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 70-97 (1973). The current state of scholarship on the
hypothesis is well summarized, with exhaustive citations, in Gilson & Kraakman, The Mech-
anisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
1010 [Vol. 70:1005
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defined in the relevant literature, but appears to mean that, given
any particular model of individual investor behavior and of the re-
sulting equilibrium prices aggregated from that behavior, the mar-
ket acts "as if" every investor knew the information. I s
The implication of the empirical studies supporting the efficient
market hypothesis19 is that the average investor need not know any
particular bit of information to participate in the market on a
"fair" basis with other outsiders. As best anyone who had all the
information available to outsiders would be able to tell, the actual
value of a security is as likely to be above as to be below market
price. In statistical terms, the price is "unbiased." 20 Every outside
buyer or seller buying or selling the security at the market price is
in the same position. Knowing particular information will not help
spot a winner or a loser because the significance of such informa-
tion has already been reflected in the security's price.
The efficient market hypothesis suggests, assuming no trading
on inside information, that whether the level of information availa-
ble to the market is high or low, it is a fair game for all partici-
pants. Information improvement resulting from underwriter due
diligence will not make the game fairer. If the hypothesis is cor-
rect, the policy implications of the view of the market as Las Vegas
18 Fama, supra note 17, at 388; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 554-55.
19 A considerable number of empirical studies are consistent with this hypothesis to the
extent that it applies to bits of publicly available "hard data," such as earnings reports, the
decision of a firm to split its stock, and the decision of a firm to set its level of dividends.
See K. Garbade, Securities Markets 249-59 (1982); J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 17,
at 83-87; Fame, supra note 17, at 405-09. Once such a bit of information becomes available
to anyone outside of the corporation's insiders, the studies suggest that it is very quickly
fully reflected in the price of the security. These tests of the speed at which market prices
adjust to obviously relevant publicly available information constitute what Fame refers to as
the "semi-strong" test of the efficient market hypothesis. Fama, supra note 17, at 388. Im-
portantly, the hypothesis has not been confirmed by what Fama labels "strong form" tests
of its validity-tests aimed at determining whether market prices also fully reflect nonpub-
lic informaton. Id. See Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. Fin. 1141 (1976);
Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974); Lorie & Niederhoffer,
Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.L. & Econ. 35, 52-53 (1968).
Due diligence can be viewed as part of a federal regulatory scheme to make the nonpublic
information that these studies suggest is not reflected in the market prices of publicly
traded securities public, so that the prices will reflect all information.
20 A price is unbiased when E (price - actual value) = 0, where E is the expected value
operator based on all publicly known "hard" information. If this is true, the market is a
"fair game" in the sense that no one can expect systematically to make trading profits (prof-
its above the normal expected return from an investment in a security of this risk category)
using any of this information. Fame, supra note 17, at 384-85.
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are clear. The maintenance of fairness is the only obvious role, if
there is any, for government regulation of a zero-sum game not af-
fecting anyone who does not play. There is therefore no justifica-
tion for legal rules that induce underwriter due diligence. 1
B. The Securities Market as a Place to Store Savings
Some investors buy securities as an alternative to Las Vegas, but
clearly others, believing the efficient market hypothesis and having
no special faith in their luck, buy securities because it is a way to
store their savings that historically has produced, on average, a
positive rate of return.22 Much modern finance literature focuses
exclusively on this type of investor, and recommends strategies for
indentifying a portfolio of securities that, given the individual in-
vestor's tastes, will have the optimal combination of risk and re-
turn. In her analysis of why the information improvement induced
by underwriter due diligence produces no benefits, Professor Ba-
noff implicitly embraces this view of the role of the securities mar-
kets in the economy.23
Professor Banoff's argument is an apparently straightforward
application of portfolio choice theory.2 4 Even assuming that the
" Underwriter due diligence could be viewed as a means of supplementing direct prohibi-
tions on insider trading. The more information that the federal securities laws force to be
disclosed, the less inside information exists to tempt potential insider traders. Under this
view, due diligence could be justified even if the market is considered simply as a substitute
Las Vegas.
22 From 1926 to 1974, the annual inflation-adjusted rate of return on a representative
sample of common stocks was 6.1%. Ibbotson & Sinquefield, Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Infla-
tion: Year-by-Year Historical Returns (1926-1974), 49 J. Bus. 11, 39 (1976).
23 Banoff, supra note 1, at 182-83.
24 Portfolio choice theory traces its origins to an article by Markowitz in 1952 that pre-
scribed how an investor, given his tastes concerning the tradeoff between expected return
and risk, should construct an optimal portfolio using the expected return, variance, and
covariances of each available security. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77 (1952).
See also H. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments (1959);
Tobin, Liquidity Preference and Behavior Towards Risk, 25 Rev. Econ. Stud. 65 (1958). In
1961 Sharpe developed a simplified version of the Markowitz model in which the investor
constructs his optimal portfolio on the basis of expected return, the portion of the variance
of the return of the security that is perfectly correlated with the return on the market as a
whole (i.e., systematic or "beta" risk), and the portion of the return of the security that is
independent of the return on the market as a whole (i.e., unsystematic or "alpha" risk).
Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 Mgmt. Sci. 277 (1963). For straightfor-
ward expositions of these theories, see J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 17, at 171-210;
W. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets 96-101 (1970). The exact number of se-
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price of a security is the result of the operations of an efficient
market, she observes that investment in the security is risky in the
sense that its actual value may be above or below its price. There
are two components to this risk: unsystematic risk, which is com-
pany- or industry-specific, and systematic risk, which is common
to the market as a whole. The information improvement that re-
sults from underwriter due diligence is company-specific informa-
tion and only reduces the unsystematic risk associated with an in-
vestment in the company's securities. Reducing unsystematic risk
in this fashion involves real costs ultimately passed on to inves-
tors."5 Unsystematic risk can be eliminated from an investor's port-
folio more cheaply by diversification. Legally induced due diligence
thus results, Banoff contends, in a needless expenditure of re-
sources for which investors would not willingly choose to pay.
Professor Banoff's conclusion is that no increase in the expected
accuracy of the price of any single security resulting from an im-
provement in information about its issuer is worthwhile. A price is
relatively accurate if it is relatively close, whether above or below,
to a security's actual value. When a price has a high expected accu-
racy, on average the deviation of the price from the actual value is
small.26 As Kenneth Arrow has said, "uncertainty is... the com-
plement of knowledge, 2 7 so if less is known about an issuer, the
price of its securities will have a lower expected accuracy than if
more is known.28 Although the efficient market hypothesis assures
curities in a properly diversified portfolio is a matter of some debate, but, given transaction
costs, including more than 20 seems to be counterproductive. Cohen, The Suitability Rule
and Economic Theory, 80 Yale L.J. 1604, 1613 (1971). For application of the theories to the
regulation of investment advisers and trustees, see Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and
Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 Am. B. Found. Research J. 1; Langbein & Posner, Market
Funds and Trust-Investment Laws, 1976 Am. B. Found. Research J. 1; Pozen, Money Man-
agers and Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 923, 940-53 (1976).
'a Due diligence involves the time of many highly-paid executives, lawyers, and
accountants.
2' This conception of expected accuracy can be put in statistical terms. Price is a random
variable generated by a distribution function that, because price is unbiased, has a mean
equal to actual value. The variance of this distribution-the expected value of the square of
deviation of price from actual value-is the measure of the expected accuracy of the price.
Definitions for these statistical terms can be found in R. Hogg & A. Craig, Introduction to
Mathematical Statistics 16-28, 34-40 (2d ed. 1965).
27 Arrow, Control in Large Corporations, 10 Mgmt. Sci. 397, 404 (1964).
" The connection between the level of information in the market and the expected accu-
racy is aptly stated by Stigler: "[p]rice dispersion is a manifestation-and, indeed, it is the
measure-of ignorance in the market." Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol.
1984] 1013
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an investor that, whatever its accuracy, the price of each security is
unbiased, 9 a risk averse investor holding just one or a few securi-
ties would be happier if they were relatively accurately priced. Pro-
fessor Banoff argues that risk averse investors can avoid this prob-
lem by spreading their investment dollars over a diversified
portfolio of securities. Then, even if little is known about each is-
suer, so that the price of each security can be expected to be rela-
tively inaccurate, the inaccuracies will have little impact on the in-
vestor because they will be independent of each other. In some
cases the price will be inaccurately high and in some inaccurately
low; the inaccuracies will tend to cancel out each other.
This second view of the market would be sufficiently broad for
the purpose of making policy if the market consisted only of sec-
ondary trades of previously issued securities, stock purchases were
never based on a desire to acquire control of the issuer, and execu-
tive compensation was never affected by stock price. In such a hy-
pothetical world, what happens in the market would have no effect
on real economic events. Participants in the market would simply
be trading rights to autonomously supplied streams of shareholder
distributions. The welfare of the participants in the market would
be all that mattered, and would be determined by the characteris-
tics of their portfolios, which if properly composed, would not be
affected by any inaccuracies in the prices of individual securities
caused by a lack of company-specific information. In such a world,
the use of portfolio theory to prescribe changes in securities law
might be valid.30
Econ. 213, 214 (1961).
29 See supra note 20.
so Even then, it might not be valid. There are two serious problems with using portfolio
theory to prescribe changes in securities law even in this hypothetical world. First, a signifi-
cant number of investors do not fully diversify their portfolios. The risk averse among them
would be hurt as a result of a decrease in the accuracy of the prices of individual securities.
Professor Banoff's advice to these persons is essentially "let them diversify." She believes
their preference to be insured by underwriter due diligence should not be respected because
they do not bear the full burden of the cost of this insurance. Banoff, supra note 1, at 183
n.229. Perhaps the fact that they do not bear the full burden should be attributed to the
shareholders who do diversify and decide not to take advantage of the insurance. Many of
the people who do not diversify are small investors who cannot economically diversify ex-
cept through the purchase of a managed or unmanaged mutual fund. To tell them to diver-
sify is to tell them that they cannot purchase stocks on the basis of their best guesses as to
their future prices. The efficient market hypothesis does not assure us that their efforts are
futile. Whether they are futile depends on the information the investors use to base their
1014 [Vol. 70:1005
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C. The Securities Market as a Nerve Center for the Real
Economy
The problem with the preceding view, however, is that this hy-
pothetical world is not the real one. The broadest view of the se-
curities market reveals an additional function. The securities mar-
ket monitors and structures the allocation of scarce resources in
the economy: it decides which proposed investment projects are
implemented and how the economy's existing productive capacity
is used. Most of these choices are made, at least in the first in-
stance, by the management of existing corporations. Security
prices and the information that is used to establish them are cen-
tral to the working of three mechanisms that limit the discretion of
management faced with these choices: the cost of capital to indi-
vidual corporations, the market for corporate control, and stock
price based management compensation schemes. Given this third,
broadest view, there are benefits from the increase in the expected
accuracy of the prices of individual securities as a result of infor-
mation improvements from underwriter due diligence.
1. Cost of Capital
Real investment is the use of resources such as skilled labor, ma-
chinery, bricks, and mortar to create new capacity in the economy
to produce a particular good or service. Purchasing these resources
usually requires spending more money than the new project can be
expected to generate in the near future. The funds to cover this
deficit might come from the net revenues of current operations,
from a loan, or from the sale of new equity or debt securities. Each
guesses. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The mechanisms behind the efficient
market hypothesis are not as well understood as the evidence that the market is efficient
with respect to "hard" publicly available data. Very little is known about the impact on
these mechanisms of changes in policy. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 565-92. It is
possible that small investors have a diverse base of knowledge of small facts that can permit
them to profit occasionally and that their speculation does contribute to price accuracy.
The second problem is that Professor Banoff's argument contemplates not a reduction in
information about just one issuer, but about every issuer in the market. That might impair
the market's understanding of the relationship between the unpredictable factors that affect
the performance of all corporations, the factors that cause systematic risk, and the perform-
ance of each corporation. The result might be an increase in the riskiness of the market as a




of these methods of funding will eventually result in a diversion of
money that would otherwise be distributed as dividends, so the ex-
penditure inevitably involves a cost to existing shareholders.'i This
is the "cost of capital, ' 2 the figure that a management dedicated
to maximizing shareholder welfare 3 must weigh against the bene-
fits of the new capacity. Although corporate finance scholars disa-
gree to some extent on how to measure a firm's cost of capital,
most believe that a firm's share price is relevant to the
calculation. 4
If the market prices of securities are inaccurate, a misallocation
of resources for real investment can occur.35 Consider two firms, X
and Y, which are identical, apart from the following exceptions. X
shares are priced inaccurately high and Y shares are priced inaccu-
rately low. Each is considering a new investment project of equal
cost and equal risk, but anyone who knows the details of each pro-
ject would conclude that Y's project has a higher expected return
than X's. Assume for a moment that the only way each of the
firms can provide funds for its project is by issuing new shares. X's
cost of capital will be less than Y's because X will need to issue
fewer new shares to raise the same amount of money. Under these
circumstances, after weighing the costs and benefits of implement-
ing their respective projects, X may decide to go ahead, 6 and Y
31 A reduction in future dividends decreases the current actual value of a security. See
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
3Z This idea that the cost of a project is the opportunity cost to shareholders of not re-
ceiving funds is presented in D. Farrar & J. Meyer, Managerial Economics 63-67 (1970).
33 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
3 E. Brigham, Financial Management: Theory and Practice 552-570 (3d ed. 1982); E.
Donaldson, J. Pfahl & P. Mullins, Corporate Finance 444-62 (4th ed. 1975); D. Farrar & J.
Meyer, supra note 32, at 63-67; J. Van Horne, Financial Management and Policy 231-36 (6th
ed. 1983).
S. Robbins, The Securities Markets: Operations and Issues 47-48 (1966); Barry, The
Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1307, 1315-19 (1981).
31 There is a theoretical argument that the overpricing of X shares should have no effect
on X's decision whether to implement the project. If management of a firm with overpriced
shares determines that the rate of return on the project is below what shareholders could
earn if they received an amount of dividends equal to the cost of the project and reinvested
them, the firm should sell additional shares anyway, but instead of investing the proceeds in
the project, should pay them out as additional dividends. Fischel argues along these lines in
defense of the proposition that a firm's dividend decision is independent of its investment
policy. Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 Va. L. Rev. 699 (1981).
There is little evidence, however, that corporations behave this way.
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may decide not to proceed. 7 Because of inaccurate security prices,
scarce resources would be used to implement X's project, even
though Y's project is superior.
Generally, of course, a sale of a new issue of shares is not the
only way to provide funds for a project. But that fact does not
make share price irrelevant to a firm's cost of capital and its deci-
sion whether to implement a particular project. First, for X, over-
priced shares mean that it will probably finance the project by a
sale of shares even if other sources are available. Second, the mis-
information that causes inaccuracies in the prices of X and Y
shares," as well as the share prices themselves, 9 will affect the
prices of any new issue of bonds or preferred stock and the terms
on which a financial intermediary will be willing to make a loan.
The fact that all outside sources of funds may be affected in a like
manner is important because the amount of funds available to a
firm from internal sources is limited, at most, to its net revenues
37 One might argue that because management would be glad to provide voluntarily any
information that would improve its share price, the shares of a firm engaging in a public
offering would never be priced inaccurately low for a reason that due diligence could correct.
One reason this argument is wrong is that management might wish to withhold informa-
tion even if it would improve share price. For example, the information might be of value to
a competitor. See Easterbrook & Fischel, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 685-86 (1984). If all firms act
under a regime inducing greater disclosure of information that may be useful to competitors,
any particular fim will sometimes gain and sometimes lose. In the long run the effects will
balance out. Yet the regime inducing greater disclosure would produce a social gain because
securities would be more accurately priced. Management might also wish to withhold infor-
mation that, despite its favorable impact on price, would increase the chance of takeover by
enabling a potential predator to assess more accurately the value of the firm in its hands.
See infra text accompanying note 46; cf. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for
a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 741-42 (1984) (management might wish
to withhold information and then buy the stock at artificially low prices).
A second reason why the argument is wrong is that a firm that truthfully discloses no bad
news might be priced lower in a market without due diligence than in one with it: the mar-
ket would assign a higher probability to the possibility that the absence of bad news was a
lie.
Modigliani and Miller, as part of their argument that financial structure is irrelevant,
suggest that the market evaluates the expected level and riskiness of a firm's whole income
stream before deduction for interest. The capital structure of a firm is the way the firm
parcels out rights to portions of that stream. Thus the price of debt and equity are each
functions of the same evaluation based on the same information. Modigliani & Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261
(1958).
39 Kripke argues that the market price of a firm's shares can directly affect its borrowing
power and the interest it pays on debt. H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure:
Regulation in Search of a Purpose 123 (1979).
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from operations, and if management feels a certain dividend pay-
out is necessary, to an amount less than that.
Finally, many finance theorists argue that there is an optimal
debt/equity ratio for the firm.40 If a firm possessing an optimal ra-
tio chooses to finance a particular project entirely by debt, it must
keep in mind the cost of equity, because it will need to engage in
additional equity financing at some point in the future to restore
the optimal ratio. Similarly, a firm with such a ratio financing a
project entirely with retained earnings will need to engage in addi-
tional debt financing in the future. For a firm following the advice
of such theorists, the appropriate measure of its cost of capital is a
mix of its cost of debt and its costs of internally and externally
raised equity.41
2. The Market for Corporate Control
Managers and their motivations also influence the allocation of
resources. Management determines whether the corporation should
incur the cost of capital necessary to implement each investment
project it is considering. Management also decides how to use the
corporation's existing productive capacity-the level of production
of each good and service capable of being produced by such capac-
ity and the combination of inputs used to achieve that level. Con-
ventional economic theory holds that in a competitive economy
where antisocial behavior, such as pollution, is properly regulated,
management decisions that are best for existing shareholders are
also the ones that allocate the economy's scarce resources most
efficiently. 42
Most large corporations in the United States are "management
controlled." Share ownership is so dispersed that management can
40 Notwithstanding Modigliani and Miller's argument concerning the irrelevance of finan-
cial structure, see supra note 38, there are factors weighing against both too little debt and
too much. A small amount of debt deprives the firm of the tax deductions arising from
interest payments. A large amount of debt creates significant conflicts of interest between
debtholders and shareholders that require expensive supervision by debtholders to prevent
management from making decisions contrary to debtholder interests. It also increases the
chances of bankruptcies, which involve significant costs. E. Brigham, supra note 34, at 641-
66.
41 See sources cited supra note 34.
42 W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 395-400 (4th ed. 1977); M.
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133 (1962); P. Samuelson, Economics 591 (11th ed.
1980).
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perpetuate itself indefinitely by controlling the firm's proxy ma-
chinery and nominating as directors its own members and persons
friendly to current management. 3 There is no assurance that the
decisions made by such a management group will be the ones that
are in the best interests of shareholders. Management may not be
competent, and even if it is, its best interests are sometimes differ-
ent from those of the shareholders. A corporate manager, like any-
one, can be expected to value compensation, perquisites, respect,
power, affection, a sense of rectitude, and job security. The deci-
sions the manager makes for the firm may affect the level of these
rewards. The extent to which a manager makes decisions that are
in the best interests of shareholders depends on the structure of
incentives in which he operates.
One obvious way that shareholders might prevent management
decisions that are not in the best interests of shareholders is for
them to replace an unsatisfactory management by electing one
more to their liking. But as noted, ownership of management con-
trolled corporations is so dispersed that concerted action of this
sort is nearly impossible. On the other hand, if an existing share-
holder or an outsider can purchase enough shares of the corpora-
tion to obtain a controlling interest, he can replace incumbent
management on his own." The existence of such a market for cor-
porate control results in incompetent or self-interested manage-
ment being terminated by takeover. Equally important, the fear of
a takeover will motivate incumbent management to make decisions
more in accord with the best interests of shareholders than it
might otherwise make.
" W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Corporations: Cases and Materials 208-09 (5th ed. 1980); E.
Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power 54 (1981). Herman estimates that 78 of the
largest 100 industrial corporations and 165 of the largest 200 nonfinancial corporations are
management controlled. Id. at 58-61. See also Palmer, The Separation of Ownership from
Control in Large US Industrial Corporations, Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus., Autumn 1972, at 55. A
sense of the share of the economy's allocation decisions that are made by the managements
of management controlled firms comes from the congressional testimony of Michael Pert-
schuk, former FTC Chairman. He estimated that in 1977 the largest 200 manufacturing
corporations had a 60% share of all manufacturing assets and that in 1976, 451 firms con-
trolled 70% of all manufacturing assets. Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1978) (statement of Michael Pertschuk).
" Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). A
brief survey of the work in this area is found in F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance 37-38 (2d ed. 1980).
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The effectiveness of the market for corporate control in restrict-
ing management discretion depends on the accuracy of the price of
a firm's shares and the quality of information available to the mar-
ket concerning the firm's operations. To see the relevance of the
accuracy of a firm's share price, consider the following example.
Suppose that the incumbent management of a firm (the target) is
making decisions that are not in the best interests of its sharehold-
ers, and that an outsider is aware of this mismanagement and
thinks that it could do a better job. Assume for a moment that the
outsider is certain of how much the target will be worth in its
hands.45 If the target's share price accurately states the value of
the firm assuming the continuation of incumbent management, the
outsider will find a takeover worthwhile. The price it must pay to
acquire the shares necessary to effect the takeover will be less than
what the shares will be worth once it is in control. But if the price
is inaccurate, and the inaccuracy sufficiently overstates actual
value, the takeover will not be worthwhile, notwithstanding the
poor quality of incumbent management's decisions and the out-
sider's certainty as to the greater worth of the target in its hands.
The more inaccurate share prices are generally, the more cases
there will be where the takeover mechanism will fail because the
target's share price is too high.
To see the relevance of the quality of information available to
the market, consider a variation on the example above. Assume,
more realistically, that the outsider's assessment of the value of the
target in its hands, though unbiased, is uncertain because the out-
sider is not perfectly informed about the future.46 Thus, the out-
sider knows that in any particular case his assessment is equally
likely to be too high or too low, and is unlikely to be exactly right.
In this situation, even if both the price of the shares and the as-
sessment are correct, the outsider cannot be confident of these
facts and, if risk averse, may not undertake the takeover despite
the expected gain from doing so.
The outsider's fear results from the all or nothing aspect of a
takeover. The outsider must acquire a certain number of shares or
45 This assumption of certainty is unrealistic, but its unrealism makes the market for
corporate control appear more effective on average than it really is in restricting manage-
ment discretion.
46 See supra notes 20, 26 and accompanying text.
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it will be unable to effect the transfer of control on which its ex-
pectation of gain is based. For a target corporation of any signifi-
cance, this minimum number of shares would constitute a large in-
vestment relative to the size of the typical outsider's portfolio.
Altering the portfolio to include these shares would add to its risk-
iness because the unsystematic component of the risk could not be
fully diversified away. The outsider's expected gain from the trans-
fer of control may not be sufficient to compensate for the added
risk. When more information about a potential target is available
to the market, less unsystematic risk will be involved in an out-
sider's assessment of what the firm would be worth in its hands,
and less expected gain will be necessary to motivate the outsider to
undertake the takeover.
3. Stock Price Based Management Compensation Schemes
The role of share price in motivating management .is not con-
fined to its place in the operation of the market for corporate con-
trol. A number of management compensation schemes-stock op-
tions, stock appreciation rights, warrants, and employee stock
ownership plans-depend on share price to determine the magni-
tude of the reward given the recipient.47
The importance of such schemes is clear given the shortcomings
of the other incentives for aligning management interests with
those of the shareholders. The takeover threat is a relatively blunt
instrument for limiting management discretion. Those parts of a
manager's compensation package not tied to share price also have
problems as effective alignment mechanisms. Straight contractual
salary will have no effect on management decisions, because it is
set in advance and does not vary with performance. The promise of
year-end bonuses and future salary increases based on merit are
devices by which top management as a group can reward those
members who have made decisions contributing to the group's
goals. Incentives awarded by a management group, however, will
protect shareholders only if there is in turn a way to align the in-
terests of the group with those of the shareholders. A profit-shar-
ing arrangement may work to align management and shareholder
interests to some extent, but a defect in those plans is that "profit"
47 F. Scherer, supra note 44, at 36.
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is an accounting figure that at best captures only imprecisely many
of the gains and losses experienced by a firm.48 Profit-sharing ar-
rangements often create incentives to make decisions that empha-
size a firm's short-run performance over its long-run perform-
ance.4 In contrast, when a manager, in choosing among alternative
courses of action, chooses the one that most benefits the firm, that
choice will on average have the most positive immediate effect on
share price, even if the benefit will not be realized until some point
in the future.50
These virtues might suggest that it would be desirable to have
each top manager's compensation entirely stock price based.
Shareholders and management would both gain. At the beginning
of the year, management would receive a compensation package
with a higher expected yield than if the package were not stock
price based, but not so much higher that shareholders would re-
ceive none of the benefits from the resulting improvement in man-
agement decisions.5 1 The problem again is risk. Compensation
based on share price might end up well above or well below what is
expected. For the typical manager, his job compensation is a large
part of his annual income, so this risk cannot be diversified away.
The accuracy of share price again turns out to be important in
the efficient allocation of resources. The higher the expected accu-
racy of a firm's share price, the more willing a manager will be for
a large portion of his compensation package to be share price
based. With more of his compensation based on share price, a
manager will be more motivated to make decisions that are in the
shareholders' best interests.
48 For example, research and development expenditures are generally not capitalizable
and must be treated as a current expense even though they may enhance the future reve-
nues of the firm as much as capital expenditures for bricks and mortar. Financial Account-
ing Standards Board, Statement No. 2 (1974).
4" It is true that long term investments will eventually start producing recognizable "prof-
its," but if the manager expects to retire or leave the firm, he will have a shorter time
horizon than shareholders, and will not take such profits into account.
o There is evidence that a compensation package that emphasizes stock returns results in
management decisions more in the interests of shareholders. Masson, Executive Motiva-
tions, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 J. PoL Econ. 1278, 1289 (1971).
*" The concept that it can be in the interests of both shareholders and management to
develop an incentive structure that limits management discretion derives from agency the-
ory. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm- Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
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D. Choosing the Appropriate View for the Making of Policy
Which of these three views of the securities market is the most
appropriate for the making of regulatory policy? The first view,
the market as Las Vegas, is clearly too narrow. The proportion of
publicly traded securities held by institutional investors, such as
insurance companies, pension trusts, and conservative, income-ori-
ented mutual funds, 2 is sufficient evidence that the market serves
a function beyond speculation.
The second view, which takes account of the function of the
market as a place to store savings, would, as we have seen, be suffi-
ciently broad if all that occurred in the market for securities were
secondary trades of previously issued securities, no one ever made
a purchase of a security with a desire to acquire control of its is-
suer, and no executive received stock price based compensation.
But none of these assumptions are valid.
It is clear that the third, broadest view should be the one on
which policy is based. Only this view adequately accounts for the
socially desirable mechanisms of cost of capital, the market for cor-
porate control, and stock price based compensation schemes. The
only way to avoid this conclusion is to argue that, as a practical
matter, the securities market has through these mechanisms only a
de minimis effect on choices concerning the implementation of in-
vestment projects and the utilization of existing productive
capacity.
The claim that the price of an issuer's securities has little effect
on whether it will engage in any particular investment project re-
flects a respectable intellectual tradition. The late A.A. Berle, for
example, argued twenty years ago that because large corporations
generate most of their capital expenditure funds from internal
sources, and because most trades in the stock market are second-
ary, the market is more appropriately considered as an allocator of
wealth among its participants than as an allocator of capital among
business enterprises.53 More recently, Professor Homer Kripke,
picking up on the same theme, has argued that SEC-mandated dis-
" In 1980, financial intermediaries held 36%, measured by market value, of the domesti-
cally held shares of United States nonfimancial institutions. SEC Monthly Statistical Rev.,
Aug. 1980, at 8.




closure does not affect allocational efficiency in the economy."
These commentators made too hasty a judgment.
To start, the absolute amount of investment funds raised by cor-
porations through public offerings of new securities, over seventy-
two billion dollars in 1982,55 is very large, even if most corporate
investment funds are internally generated. Moreover, a significant
portion of all large corporations do, in fact, raise some investment
funds through public offerings of new securities.56 It is ironic that
Professor Banoff chose to apply her argument using portfolio the-
ory to the value of Securities Act disclosure, rather than to the
value of Exchange Act disclosure. Whatever the effect of securities
prices on the investment behavior of firms that do not engage in
any public offerings, it is much harder to argue that prices have no
such effect on those that do-the target group of the Securities Act
registration process.
Even in the case of firms that do not engage in any external fi-
nancing, the prices of their securities would still influence their in-
vestment behavior. Assuming that management of such a firm is
interested in maximizing shareholder welfare, management would
take the firm's securities prices into account when calculating the
firm's cost of capital.57 Of course there is the question of how inter-
ested the management is in maximizing shareholder welfare, but
that question simply shifts our attention to the other two mecha-
nisms whose effectiveness depends on individual share price accu-
racy: the market for corporate control and stock price based man-
agement compensation. As was shown, these mechanisms limit
management discretion not only in making investment choices, but
also in deciding how to use existing productive capacity. Despite
the limitations of these mechanisms for-aligning management and
shareholder interests, it is hard to deny their importance in the
economy. A casual reading of the newspapers will reveal that even
s H. Kripke, supra note 39, at 134-39. Berle must have been chagrined that his argument
was turned around against the government regulatory efforts he helped to create and later
continued to support. See Berle, supra note 53, at 433-35.
" U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-83, at 518,
Table 858 (103d ed. 1982).
"A computer search of SEC filings, conducted at the request of the author by Disclo-
sure, Inc., revealed that 190 of the "Fortune 500" largest companies in the United States
filed at least one S-1, S-2, or S-3 registration statement during the 18 month period from
May 1982 through November 1983.
11 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the managements of the largest U.S. corporations are not insulated
from the fear of a hostile takeover. There is evidence that in large
corporations a significant share of top managers' compensation is
stock price based. 8
What happens in the securities market is important to real eco-
nomic events, and not just to those who trade.59 Improved infor-
mation about individual issuers increases the expected accuracy of
the prices of their securities. Increased price accuracy improves the
functioning of the mechanisms that link the market with these real
events and enhances the efficient allocation of resources. Policy-
makers should keep these effects in mind when considering rules
that might affect price accuracy. In particular, integrated disclos-
ure should be scrutinized to see whether it will reduce the amount
and quality of information available to the market by reducing un-
derwriter due diligence.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE PROGRAM ON
UNDERWRITER DuE DILIGENCE
A. Changes in the Environment in Which Due Diligence
Occurs
The integrated disclosure program will substantially affect the
environment in which an underwriter conducts due diligence. Be-
cause most of the short form S-3 consists of material incorporated
by reference from an issuer's Exchange Act filings that in long
form registrations was set out in full,60 the underwriter no longer
plays a role in drafting these parts of the S-3 at the time of regis-
tration. 1 In theory, the underwriter can ask that incorporated lan-
" Information gathered by Lewellen on the compensation of the five top managers of
each of 50 large U.S. corporations showed that during the period 1940-1963, the average
yearly ratio of the total dividends, capital gains and changes in the value of stock options
accruing to these executives compared to their total salary, bonuses, and noncontributory
pension benefits was, on an after tax basis, 1.36. W. Lewellen, The Ownership Income of
Management 103 (1971).
&9 One should note also that to the extent that the overall economy improves, investors as
a group are better off.
"See supra note 8.
,1 The drafting of the long form registration statement was a group exercise involving the
issuer, the underwriter, and their respective counsel. The first draft, which was ususally
prepared by the issuer, might in many places track the language of the issuer's annual Ex-
change Act filing (the 10-K), but there was a general understanding that none of the lan-
guage was sacred, and the underwriters and their counsel participated in redrafting the
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guage be explicitly corrected, either by an 8-K filing or in the
registration statement itself, but an issuer is likely to resist strenu-
ously. A correction implies that one of its prior filings was some-
how defective.62 The short form increases the speed with which se-
curities may be offered to the public. It takes very little time to
prepare an S-3 registration statement and, once filed, it can be-
come effective in as little as forty-eight hours.6 3 A process that
once inevitably took a few weeks to a few months now can be un-
dertaken in a few days, a period far shorter than underwriters tra-
ditionally devoted to due diligence. In the past, the active partici-
pation of the underwriter in the drafting of the registration
statement, combined with the extensive examination of the com-
pany permitted by the time schedule, interacted to create a process
that often by the final draft revealed a great deal about the issuer
not revealed in its Exchange Act filings." The universal view of
those who have commented on this process is that it frequently
resulted in significant additional disclosure. 5
Shelf registration accentuates the effects of these changes in en-
vironment. There is unlikely to be even minimal underwriter in-
volvement in preparation of the registration statement that occurs
with a non-shelf-registered S-3. The issuer can name several poten-
tial managing underwriters in its registration statement (without
their permission), and then select one to underwrite any particular
block of shares when the issuer decides to offer it.66 Securities can
be offered to the public within hours of being taken off the shelf,
registration statement on a line-by-line basis. There was a concern in the sequence of pres-
entation both with providing appropriate emphasis for particularly material facts and avoid-
ing the presentation of facts out of context. For a good description of the traditional regis-
tration process of a public offering of securities, see Pryor & Smith, Significant Changes in
Primary Stock Distributions over the Last 25 Years, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 9, 1982, at 21, 39-41.
See also Fortenbaugh, Underwriters' Due Diligence, 14 Rev. Sec. Reg. 799, 805 (1981);
Hovdesven & Wolfram, Underwriter Liability in the Integrated Disclosure System, Nat'l
L.J., July 5, 1982, at 13, col 1.
62 Hovdesven & Wolfram, supra note 61, at 13, col 4; Pryor & Smith, Disclosure and
Capital Formation Policies, Natl L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 15, col 4.
Nicholas, supra note 13, at 21.
Nicholas, supra note 13, at 15; Hovdesven & Wolfram, supra note 61, at 13, col. 4.
Release No. 6423, supra note 5, 47 Fed. Reg. at 39,806-07, reprinted in [1982 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,250, at 85,285-86; Nicholas, supra note 13, at 3;
Hovdesven & Wolfram, supra note 61, at 13, col. 4; Pryor & Smith, supra note 62, at 15, col.
4.
"The underwriter may, of course, decline to participate in the offering.
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with the chosen underwriter being deprived of even the few days in
which to conduct a due diligence investigation that would be avail-
able with a non-shelf-registered short form offering.
In response to criticisms that this change in environment would
impede due diligence, the SEC has suggested that interaction be-
tween the issuer and the underwriters will occur when the 10-Ks,
10-Qs, and 8-Ks are drafted. 7 The disciplining effect of due dili-
gence on disclosure traditionally associated with the drafting of Se-
curities Act registration statements will instead become associated
with the drafting of an issuer's Exchange Act filings. The speed
with which public offerings can be consummated need not impede
due diligence, because the underwriter will already be examining
the issuer on a regular basis.
There are, however, reasons to believe that underwriters will not
often participate in the drafting of Exchange Act filings, and that
when they do, the nature of their participation will differ from
what it has been in the drafting of traditional registration state-
ments. In most cases, neither the issuer nor any particular invest-
ment bank can be confident, when an Exchange Act filing is
drafted, that the issuer will engage in a public offering with the
investment bank in question as managing underwriter.68 The more
distant relationship between the issuer and the banker may deter
the issuer from providing "soft" confidential information, 9 as well
as increase its resistance to underwriter intrusion in the drafting of
what the issuer considers to be "its" document. Because the invest-
ment bank is far from certain to receive any return for its efforts,
it, in turn, will invest fewer resources in drafting documents and in
examining the firm than it would with a traditional registration.
7 SEC Securities Act Release No. 6335, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,015, 42,019-21 (1981), reprinted
in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Spec. Rep. No. 926, 2d extra ed., at 88-95 (Aug. 13, 1981) [here-
inafter cited as Release No. 6335].
" Nicholas, supra note 13, at 34; Hovdesven & Wolfram, supra note 61, at 15, col. 1.
" Professor Banoff suggests that for shelf registrations "the most convenient method of
conducting continuing due diligence" is for the issuer to hire special counsel for the under-
writers at the time of registration. Banoff, supra note 1, at 177 n.199. This hardly seems an
adequate substitute for the traditional process. To start, because they lack financial exper-
tise, lawyers acting alone do not constitute as effective an investigatory team as lawyers and
investment bankers acting together. Moreover, despite a law firm's concern with its profes-
sional reputation and ethics, it is hard to conceive that the firm is as eager, when it repre-
sents a phantom client, to investigate the very issuer that selected it as the firm is when it
represents a real client and is selected by that client.
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Nor is the bank as likely to ask pointed, potentially antagonizing,
questions of a potential issuer that has little at stake in this rela-
tionship and that remains free to consummate its offering with a
more deferential underwriter.
Evidence confirms the limited extent of underwriter participa-
tion in the preparation of Exchange Act filings. A survey of issuers
conducted by the Securities Industries Association (SIA) in 1982
revealed that only thirteen percent involved underwriters, and only
twenty-four percent involved underwriter's counsel, in preparation
of their 10-Ks.70 The respective percentages were much lower for
10-Qs and 8-Ks. 1 Of those issuers that did not involve underwrit-
ers in the preparation of their Exchange Act filings, only twenty-
two percent expressed a willingness to do so in the future.7 2 These
rather dramatic findings may, however, need to be discounted to
some extent because the SIA actively opposed Rule 415 and con-
ducted this survey in preparation for its testimony concerning the
rule.7 8
B. Information Availability and the Current Standard of
Underwriter Liability
The changed environment in which due diligence will occur, and
the probable lack of underwriter participation in issuers' Exchange
Act filings, do not by themselves prove that the quality of issuer
disclosure will suffer under an integrated disclosure program. As
the SEC argues, "nothing compels an underwriter to proceed pre-
maturely with an offering,"7' 4 and an underwriter can delay a pub-
lic offering until it has conducted a thorough investigation of the
issuer and obtained whatever additional disclosure that investiga-
tion suggests is necessary. So long as the standard of underwriter
liability under Section 11 remains unchanged, the legal conse-
quences of an inadequate investigation remain the same.
70 Nicholas, supra note 13, at 33-34 n.92.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Banoff, supra note 1, at 155; Nicholas, supra note 13, at 33-34 n.92.
" Release No. 6335, supra note 67, 46 Fed. Reg. at 42,020, reprinted in [Current Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special Rep. No. 926, 2d extra ed., at 89. See also Greene,
supra note 5, at 795-96 (underwriters are not compelled by any Commission action to associ-
ate themselves with offerings where the issuer will not allow time for a reasonable investiga-
tion of the registration statement's contents).
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Potential liability, however, is only one item that an underwriter
will consider when deciding how much due diligence to exercise.
Integrated disclosure involves other changes to which a rational
underwriter will react. The language now incorporated by reference
in an S-3 would, in a traditional registration, have been included as
part of the prospectus, the part of the registration statement dis-
tributed to thousands of investors and market professionals. The
prospectus has on its cover the name of the managing underwriter
in letters almost as bold as those used for the name of the issuer.
Thus, the underwriter's reputation was more closely associated
with this language when it was included in the prospectus than it
is now. Another consideration is that performing the traditional
amount of due diligence would now cause a significant delay of the
offering. Under the previous regime, due diligence did not act as a
brake, because the registration procedures required considerable
time in any event. An issuer operating under integrated disclosure,
however, will see due diligence as an impediment, in an increas-
ingly volatile market, to exploiting perceived short-lived windows
of financing opportunity.75 Given the cost of the delay in the eyes
of the issuer, it may be rational for the underwriter to proceed to
market with less due diligence to avoid losing the deal.
The forgoing discussion assumes that underwriters will react in a
rational fashion to changes in the enviroment, but such an assump-
tion is questionable. Assuming participation by an underwriter in
the drafting of Exchange Act filings76 is limited or nonexistent, the
level of disclosure resulting from these filings will be less than was
the case with a traditional registration statement. An issuer, as this
article has shown, will be reluctant to grant an underwriter in-
volved in an S-3 registration the time to conduct a thorough inves-
73 In connection with a comment letter on a component of the integrated disclosure pro-
gram, Morgan Stanley & Co. collected data on 20 year treasury note weekly yields during
each year from 1971 to 1980. The average of the standard deviations for the last three years
of the period was almost three times that of the average for the first three years of the
period. Greene, supra note 5, at 789. To the extent that firms are risk neutral, the increased
volatility of the market should make no difference, because at any given time interest rates
are as likely to decrease as increase. Fama, supra note 17, at 400-01 (reporting on a study by
Roll showing that the market for treasury bills is efficient). Casual empiricism suggests,
however, that firm managers do feel that certain market conditions create temporary financ-
ing opportunities, and they prefer to be able to act quickly to take advantage of such
conditions.
79 See supra note 8.
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tigation or to agree to make additional disclosure through language
in the registration statement superseding what otherwise would be
incorporated by reference or through the filing of an 8-K. To the
extent that an underwriter insists on obtaining this additional time
and disclosure, it will be only out of fear of liability. Christopher
Stone, in his work on enterprise liability, argues persuasively that
large organizations tend not to act rationally when calculating the
tradeoff between short-run gain (in this case, getting the issuer's
business) and an increased risk of future liability for damages (in
this case, having to accept the issuer's terms concerning due dili-
gence in order to get the business)." Furthermore, at least for the
next few years, the possibility of liability will seem to underwriters
more remote than it actually is. In the past there have been rela-
tively few cases where an underwriter has had to pay out large
damages for a Section 11 claim.78 The present historical record is
the product of a period when underwriters played a traditional due
diligence role. 9
C. Effect on the Standards of Underwriter Liability
The assumption made above that integrated disclosure will have
no effect on the standards of underwriter liability is, in any case,
probably incorrect. Section 11(c) of the Securities Act provides
that the standard for judging the reasonableness of an under-
writer's investigation and belief in the truth of the registration
statement is that of a "prudent man in the management of his own
property."'80 Legislative history suggests that the conduct necessary
for an underwriter to be entitled to the due diligence defense de-
77 C. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior 42-46 (1975).
See also Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
Yale L.J. 1, 15, 19-24 (1980).
78 Of the 30,000 registration statements filed during the first 35 years after the enactment
of the Securities Act, there were only 23 cases giving rise to a Section 11 claim; of these,
only two resulted in recoveries for plaintiffs, and six in approved settlements of class ac-
tions. See L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1040; Greene, supra note 5, at 770. For a discussion of
the more recent cases, see id. at 770-81.
70 There is some evidence, again from the Securities Industry Association, that the inte-
grated disclosure program has in fact reduced the amount of underwriter due diligence. SIA
surveyed underwriters in July 1982 and found that only nine percent of underwriters be-
lieved they were performing as much due diligence as two years before. Nicholas, supra note
13, at 33-34 n.92. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
8 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1982).
[Vol. 70:10051030
1984] Shelf Registration 1031
pends on the surrounding circumstances."1 One circumstance that
might be relevant is whether an underwriter is the one managing
the issue or a minor participant in a syndicate selling the issue. 2
Similarly, Rule 17683 provides in part that in determining the rea-
sonableness of a person's conduct for purposes of Section 11(c),
relevant circumstances include "[w]hether, with respect to a fact or
document incorporated by reference, the particular person had any
responsibility for the fact or document at the time of the filing
from which it was incorporated.'" Obviously, an underwriter
would generally not have any such responsibility.
The likelihood that integrated disclosure will lower standards of
liability is reinforced by the tendency of most courts to be influ-
enced by prevailing behavior when deciding whether a particular
act is reasonable.8 5 If, for any of the reasons discussed above, inte-
01 This language was added to the Act one year after its passage. The amendment substi-
tuted the accepted common law definition of fiduciary duty for the term "fiduciary relation-
ship," because the latter term had been "terrifyingly portrayed." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (1934).
See Greene, supra note 5, at 767-70, 794.
2 There is some authority to support the argument that the managing underwriter must
engage in a more thorough investigation because of its close contact with the issuer. Greene,
supra note 5, at 775-78, 794-800.
u 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1984). The SEC had previously stated this position in official re-
leases. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5998, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,053, 56,056 (1978), reprinted in
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,761, at 81,060 (Nov. 17, 1978).
17 C.F.R. § 230.176(h) (1984). An SEC rule of this sort, which in essence interprets a
provision of a statute, is not binding on courts, but courts, out of deference to expertise, do
give considerable weight to the interpretations of the agency charged with administrating a
statute. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, the Supreme Court stated:
It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative agency's consis-
tent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to
considerable weight. This deference is a product both of an awareness of the practical
expertise which an agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new and unforeseen
problems over time.
439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1978) (citations omitted). In that case, the Court went on to reject
the SEC's interpretation, noting the Court's "obligation to honor the clear meaning of a
statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history." Id. But the Court has cited SEC
intepretations as authority in support of the Court's positions in other cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 717-19 (1974).
' The concepts of a "reasonable investigation" and a "reasonable ground to believe"
under Section 11(b) have as their common law origins the concept of nonnegligence in tort,
conduct which does not involve an unreasonably great risk of causing damage. L. Loss, Se-
curities Regulation 1729-30 (2d ed. 1961). Prosser states:
[E]vidence of the usual and customary conduct of others under similar circumstances
is normally relevant and admissible [evidence with respect to the issue of negligence],
as an indication of what the community regards as proper, and a composite judgment
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grated disclosure results in less due diligence activity, over time
courts will require less of underwriters seeking to avoid liability.
IMl. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion leads to two conclusions. The improve-
ment in the quality of information about an issuer that results
from underwriter due diligence enhances efficient allocation of re-
sources in the economy. Short form and shelf registration-the
heart of the integrated disclosure program-can be expected to re-
duce the amount of due diligence underwriters perform, and there-
fore reduce the benefits to the economy that flow from that
activity.
The real issue concerning due diligence these reforms raise is
whether the benefits of the traditional level of underwriter due dil-
igence are worth their accompanying costs. Professor Banoff and
the SEC both avoid confronting this issue. Professor Banoff ac-
cepts that the reforms may reduce the level of due diligence, but
by implicitly taking an erroneously narrow view of the functions of
the securities market, denies that due diligence produces any bene-
fits. The SEC acknowledges the value of the improvement in the
quality of information resulting from due diligence, but denies that
its reforms would reduce the level of underwriter due diligence. It
suggests that an underwriter can continue to perform its tradi-
tional level of due diligence by substituting participation in the
drafting of an issuer's Exchange Act filings for its participation in
the drafting of the registration statement. It points out that no un-
derwriter is forced to bring an offering to market before it feels it
has completed as thorough an investigation of the issuer as it tra-
ditionally conducted. Both these arguments are unpersuasive.
A great deal is at stake with these reforms. In 1982, business
expenditures in the United States for plant and equipment ex-
ceeded $328 billion, 8 and the privately generated portion of the
gross national product exceeded $2.7 trillion. 7 Firms that qualify
as to the risks of the situation and the precautions required to meet them.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts 166 (4th ed. 1971). See also Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42
Colum. L. Rev. 1147 (1942) (admissibility of business custom as evidence).
86 U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 55 at 540, Table 907 (103d ed. 1982) (estimate).
67 Economic Report of the President, at 232, Table B-10 (Feb. 1984). This figure comes
from deducting the amount for government and government enterprises from the total gross
national product.
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as S-3 issuers make decisions concerning significant portions of
these vast amounts of investment and production."" A very small
relative decline in the efficiency of choices concerning new invest-
ment projects and the uses of existing capacity will have a very
large negative effect, measured in absolute terms, on economic wel-
fare. Changes that might have an adverse effect on allocational ef-
ficiency should be undertaken only with great caution, particularly
given how well the traditional system of registering new issues of
securities has served the economy for the past fifty years.
The SEC should reconsider the integrated disclosure program by
facing squarely the real issue raised here. If, as seems likely,89 the
Commission cannot after study confidently predict that cost sav-
ings from reduced due diligence will exceed the inevitable reduc-
tion in the economy's allocational efficiency, the Commission need
not necessarily conclude that it should move backwards and scrap
a program with a number of positive features. Rather, it should
conclude that the reforms are incomplete. The disclosure systems
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act have not been fully
merged. Exchange Act filings have become the central disclosure
" See supra note 43.
- There is a considerable body of theoretical literature concerning whether a corporation
will voluntarily provide the market with as much information as is cost justified in terms of
the resources required to collect, package and disseminate it. One article suggesting it will is
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 51. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 37, at 680-87 (dis-
cussing incentives to disclose and the limitations on any self-interest model of disclosure).
But see Coffee, supra note 37 (concluding that efficiency based arguments may suppory a
mandatory disclosure system). If that position is correct, obviously the benefits from the
additional disclosure resulting from the traditional level of underwriter due diligence are not
worth the extra costs. There is also a body of empirical literature concerning whether the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act have had a meaningful effect on the level of corporate
disclosure. Compare Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market- An Evaluation of
the Securities Axchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132 (1973); Stigler, Public Regula-
tion of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964) (suggesting they have not), with Friend
& Herman, The SEC Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964) (suggesting they have).
A survey of both bodies of literature is found in Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp. L. 1 (1983). It is fair to say that opinion
on the question is divided. Certainly, there are some good reasons why the management of
an established corporation might sometimes choose not to disclose material information
even though to do so would not require a significant expenditure of resources. Arguments
made concerning why a firm might not voluntarily release favorable information-fear that
information would be of value to a competitor or to someone considering a takeover at-
tempt-apply as well to why they would not supply both favorable and unfavorable infor-
mation even where a policy of doing so would on average enhance share price. See supra
note 37.
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documents of the reformed system. But the issuer preparing these
filings is not subjected to the unique pressures for disclosure that
result from the participation of an underwriter subject to Section
11 liability. To complete the reform, the SEC should develop a
plan requiring issuers to hire an investment bank to participate in
the preparation of the issuer's Exchange Act filings. If the filing
turned out to contain materially false or misleading statements or
omissions, the bank would face liability for a substantial amount of
damages that could be avoided only by a Section 11-type due dili-
gence defense.90 Integrated disclosure would then become a reform
that raises the quality of disclosure in issuers' periodic reports to
the level traditionally associated with the registration of public of-
ferings, instead of one that lowers the quality of disclosure at the
time of a public offering to the level traditionally associated with
periodic reports.
90 The conclusions of this article also support statutory changes in accordance with sec-
tion 1704 of the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code, which would
impose liability for damages, subjest to a due diligence defense, on an issuer's principal
executive officers and directors if the issuer's annual report filed with the SEC contained a
misrepresentation or an omission of a material fact. This article also suggests that repeal of
Rule 176 would be desirable. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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